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Since independence in 1961, Tanzania has pursued a policy of institu-
tionalizing a middle peasantryl while stymieing the development of capital-
.ism's principal classes. The policy has taken an extreme form following a 1973 
decision to forcibly reorganize the majority of Tanzania's peasants on indi-
vidual block farms within nucleated villages and to bring the sphere of pro-
duction more directly under the control of the state and international finance 
capital. This attempt to subordinate peasant labor to capital by perpetuating 
middle peasant households increasingly confines capital to its most primitive 
state. The pursuit of this policy in an export-oriented agricultural economy 
has particular contradictions and limitations. As long as labor and capital 
are not separated, they cannot be combined in their technically most advanced 
form.2 Hence the contradiction of the state's attempts to extract greater 
surplus value while simultaneously acting to expand and preserve middle peas-
ant households. This paper explores the implications of such a course of 
action within the framework of Marxist writings on the agrarian question. 
Using tobacco production as, an example, it discusses the ways in which middle 
peasant households are being squeezed and pauperized by this backward capital-
ist system. It argues that the system inhibits the formal and real subordin-
ation of labor to capital and tends to perpetuate the extraction of absolute 
as opposed to relative surplus value.3 Household production fetters the 
concentration of capital and prevents the socialization of labor, while perpe-
tuating the hoe as the main instrument of production. 
The Development of Capitalism in Tanzania4 
From 1973 to 1976, Tanzania's ruling class adopted a policy of villagiz-
ation in which the majority of the country's peasants were forcibly removed 
from their scattered dwellings and resettled in nucleated villages with indi-
vidual holdings. Production continued to be based on the household; however, 
under close supervision by the state. Whereas formerly the state had kept its 
distance from the sphere of production and peasant cooperatives controlled the 
sphere of circulation, all of this changed. Freedom of movement was restricted 
and minimum acreage requirements from the 193Os were reintroduced. Government 
was decentralized to the village level and peasants were required to produce 
specified amounts of food and cash crops. Village Managers responsible to the 
Prime Minister's Office were sent to villages and put in charge of production 
as cooperatives were abolished and replaced by state crop-buying authorities, 
which were designed to act in conjunction with the state's agricultural credit 
bank (TRDB) to advance credit directly through villages and to recoup agricul-
tural commodities and loans by using village officials. Not only did the state 
directly enter the sphere of production during this period, but there was also 
a massive injection of international aid and in particular international 
finance (World Bank) capital to support the expansion of cash-crop production 
following villagization. In spite of these changes, smallholder cul ti vat ion 
has set limits on the state's ability to control the sphere of production, to 
reorganize the labor process, or to raise the productivity of labor without 
calling forth other contradictions, including pauperization.5 
*I would like to thank Mike Cowen for his useful comments on this paper. 
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Before villagization, between 1967 and 1973, Tanzania attempted to promote 
a policy of voluntary communal production known as "ujamaa". This policy of 
self-styled "socialism" and "self-reliance" never succeeded in attracting more 
than 15% to 20% of the population and generally did not deliver on its prom-
ises to increase social services and rural participation. Proletarianization 
was discouraged in the countryside, working class rights began to be restric-
ted, and corvee labor practices reasserted themselves within "ujamaa" vil-
lages. A number of other policies were adopted including nationalizations and 
a leadership code, both of which were designed to suppress the development of 
a class of rich capitalists. The ruling class itself was by all accounts a 
non-productive bureaucratic class. During the period of "ujamaa" this class 
managed to garner popular support by attacking the predictable evils of for-
eign capital, Asian merchants, and rural kulaks, while simultaneously inflat-
ing the bureaucracy and using the state as its principal vehicle of accumu-
lation. 6 Whether it was and is now also acting to transform itself into a 
full-fledged capitalist class is as yet an important, but unanswered question. 
Whatever its tendencies, the ideology propounded by this ruling class during 
the period of "ujamaa" was distinctly Narodnik. 7 Effectively it amounted to 
anti-industrial autarchy at both the level of the individual and the nation, 
with appeals to cement the middle against the extremes of bourgeoisie and 
proletariat. The consequence of attempting to implement an agrarian policy 
based on these components was the worsening condition of the middle peas-
antry, 8 predicted by Lenin in his volumes of attacks on these nineteenth-
century utopian socialists. The role of the state during this period was anal-
ogous to that of archaic merchant capital as it essentially operated in the 
sphere of exchange to plunder and rob middle and poor peasants through unequal 
exchange, but left the sphere of production largely untouched. Extraction 
tended towards the extraction of absolute surplus value. Producer prices for 
agricultural commodities declined, production stagnated, and by 1974, drought 
tipped the scale on an already marginalized and pauperized middle peasantry, 
necessitating massive food imports. Villagization was then ushered in, in the 
wake of financial ruin at both the level of the individual and the state,9 
The question of why the post-independence ruling class chose to retard 
rather than to accelerate capitalism following independence is not well under-
stood. 10 Partly, it had to do with the limited options which faced it as a 
class and the fact that materially it was divorced from production. Further-
more, the objective realities which confronted it at independence also con-
strained it. During the colonial period in contrast to the more favored nation 
of Kenya, infrastructure was poorly built up, manufacturing and industrial 
development were almost non-existent and, outside of a few areas, rural capi-
talism was poorly developed, as the colonial state had discouraged the expro-
priation of the peasantry and encouraged the continuation of simple commodity 
production. Furthermore, its inability to attract foreign capital immediately 
after independence, plus a need to legitimate itself to the mass of the popul-
ation following an attempted coup in 1964, introduced additional problems. In 
short, it would have been a momentous task for this class to transform itself 
into a proper bourgeoisie. Instead, it chose to block the development of 
competitive or disruptive classes, Although the ideology of this ruling class 
was utopian socialism, in practise it simply reinforced the petit-
bourgeoisiell in the rural areas, who used their control over cooperative 
societies to rob middle and poor peasants as well as the state's credit bank 
which was then faced with high arrears. Subsequently, the period of villagi-
zation sought to eliminate these middlemen in the sphere of exchange and to 
bring household producers more directly under the control of the state. 
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Tanzania and Marxist Theory 
Tanzania's policy appeals to "radical" populists who believe "small is 
beautiful, 1112 mistakenly associating household production and its inherent 
smallness with "the 'superiority' of people's production" (Lenin, II: 400), 
and are unwilling to admit its petit-bourgeois content. However, the Tanzanian 
reality supports Lenin's attacks on the Narodniks and others who refuse to 
"call a spade a spade" (Lenin, II: 400). Here, Lenin's predictions have come 
true: the middle peasant's tie to the land has resulted in overwork and 
under-consumption. The production of cash crops and the need to use a larger 
number of inputs intensifies the demands on household labor time, a situation 
which is further exacerbated by the state's policy of discouraging the hiring 
in of wage labor within villages.13 Smallholding inhibits any significant 
transformation of the productive forces, of the value of labor power itself, 
or of the further development of commodity relations in general, as household 
producers both produce for exchange value and to reproduce the means of 
subsistence. In Tanzania as elsewhere, as Lenin originally insisted, the 
"power of the soil" (Lenin, II: 393) in perpetuating the middle peasantry and 
retarding capitalism has been "a tremendous factor ••• in preserving methods of 
production that are primitive and entail bondage, in retarding the use of 
machinery and lowering the workers standard of living" (Lenin, II: 400). 
In discussing the middle peasantry, Lenin noted its inherent instability 
in the face of a developing capitalist economy: 
Every crop failure flings masses of the middle peasants into the 
ranks of the proletariat. In its social relations this group 
fluctuates between the top group towards which it gravitates and 
the bottom group into which it is pushed by the whole course of 
social evolution.... Thus a process specifically characteristic 
of capitalist economy takes place, the middle members are swept 
away and the extremes are reinforced--the process of 
"depeasantising" (Lenin, 1974: 184). 
Lenin vociferously rejected arguments which suggested that socialism could be 
based on what he regarded as a mythically depicted pre-capitalist Russian 
peasantry. Furthermore, he insisted that all efforts to preserved the middle 
against the extremes as a means of recapturing this mythical past and saving 
the peasantry from the horrors of industrial capitalsm would only serve to 
retard "the process of 'depeasantising,' to institutionalize capitalism in its 
least developed form, and actually to worsen the condition of the smallholder. 
Almost one hundred years after Lenin's attacks on the Narodniks, one finds 
that arguments to buttress household production and prop up the middle against 
the extremes have once again found favor, both with international development 
agencies and indigenous ruling classes, who are frightened by the political 
and economic prospects of large numbers of unemployed peasants in the cities, 
who are too weak to transform themselves into a proper bourgeoisie, and who 
need the surpluses generated by a landed middle peasantry both to reproduce 
the society and to generate foreign exchange. A case in point is Tanzania. 
However, this attempt by the state to preserve the middle peasantry and retard 
the development of bourgeoiseie and proletariat has not taken its classic 
form. The distinctive form is villagization in a period of monopoly capital-
ism, thereby raising a number of pertinent theoretical issues concerning the 
relationship between labor and capital in a situation in which primitive 




Middle peasants within villages can no longer be seen as simple commodity 
producers who operate essentially according to their own laws of motion and 
who only articulate with capital at the level of exchange. 14 Here one must 
distinguish between content and form, mindful of Lenin's criticism of the 
Narodniks and their crude equation "If the workers have no land there is 
capitalism--if they have land there is no capitalism" (Lenin, I: 209). Lenin 
spent volumes polemicizing against such a position arguing that "our liter-
ature frequently contains too stereotyped an understanding of the theoretical 
proposition that capitalism requires the free, landless worker. This propos-
ition is quite correct as indicating the main trend, but capitalism penetrates 
into agriculture particularly slowly and in extremely varied forms" (Lenin, 
1974: 181). 
With villagization, the introduction of mini.mum acreage requirements and 
the quality and quantity controls which govern the production of cash crop 
commodities, the independence of smallholders in Tanzania can only be regarded 
as a formality vis-a-vis capital. Household producers are not part of a 
separate mode of production operating independently according to their own 
laws of motion. The state is organized to extract surplus value from peasant 
labor. Middle peasants are required to produce a specified amount of both food 
and cash crops. To produce saleable commodities, they must purchase inputs on 
credit from the state, through the village and its authorities which act as 
onlenders to indi victual producers and recoup credit from them in conjunction 
with other state agents at the point of sale. The use of these inputs often 
takes place under the direction of agricultural extension officers and other 
agents of the state in the sphere of production (Mueller, 1979 ( b); Raikes, 
1980). Using these inputs in turn necessitates certain changes·and adjustments 
in the labor process itself, often placing excessive demands on household 
labor time. Juridically speaking, smallholders appear to be free; however, 
behind this formality of independence, "the relations of production which tie 
the enterprize of small commodity producers to captital are already capitalist 
relations of productions" (Banaji, 1977: 34). As Lenin and Kautsky argued, 
"[At] this stage of development [the peasant] can only formally be regarded as 
a simple commodity producer. De facto he usually has to deal with the 
capitalist--the creditor, the merchant, the industrial entrepreneur ••• " 
(Lenin, IV: 125). In Banaji' s words, the household_ at this stage is dominated 
by "the aims of capitalist production, namely by the compulsion to produce 
surplus value" (Banaji, 1977: 33). Consequently, the 
simple commodity producer [is] no longer an independent unit of 
production imposing its own laws of motion on the process of 
production but a quasi-enterprise with the specific function of 
wage labor •••• The price which the producer receives for his 
commodities is no longer a pure category of exchange, but a 
category, that is a relation of production, a concealed wage. 
Behind the superficial "surface" sale of products, peasants 
under this form of domination sell their labor power.... The 
monopsonistic determination of "prices" under this system or the 
fact that the contracts which fix this price may often also 
stipulate the volume of output required and its specific 
quality, are necessary expressions of the capitalist's "command 
over labor power" (Banaji, 1977: 34). 
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The forcible villagization of smallholders in Tanzania would appear to 
create fewer illusions concerning autonomous modes of production. 
Notwithstanding this observation, capital's "command over labor power" within 
villages is still ony partiai.15 Labor 'power is after all household labor 
confined to smallholdings, which still "retains the determinate organization 
of labor specific to the 'pre-capitalist' enterprize" (Banaji, 1977: 33). 
Labor cannot be combined, techniques are determined by the limitations of the 
household form, production to reproduce the means of subsistence continues, 
and capital's control over the labor process is inhibited by the organization 
of production itself. As Banaji suggests, 
The subjugation of the simple commodity form of production 
to capital proceeds inevitably within the limits imposed by 
the prevailing organization of production •••• Domination 
over the labour process becomes impossible on this basis 
within these limits of quasi-independence, without those 
mechanisms which uproot the patriarchal sufficiency of the 
small enterprize. The compulsory enforced destruction of 
the small producers self-sufficiency figures here as the 
necessary foundations for the dominance of capital (Banaji, 
1977: 33). 
Until this happens, Banaji maintains, 
labour process [necessarily] retains 
(Banaji, 1977: 34). 
"the capitalist's control over the 
a partial and sporadic character" 
In Tanzania, this "partial and sporadic character" is reflected in a 
variety of areas. In spite of all past and continuing efforts by the state to 
force the peasantry to produce, and to control the appropriation of surplus, 
labor continues to "wrestle" with capital (Marx, Capital, I: 367) , 
successfully showing signs of indiscipline and insubordination. These signs 
include subverting production when it appears too marginal to produce positive 
returns, diverting inputs to food crops when the returns to labor are higher 
than cash crops, becoming "sick" (Fortmann, 1978 (c): 81), frying cotton 
seeds, planting cassava cuttings upside down (Raikes, 1975: 41-42), destroying 
the roots of tobacco plants and refusing to harvest tea when profits would be 
slim to non-existent, following deductions for inputs, feigning stupidity to 
avoid certain quality and quantity controls in the production process, and so 
on. Agricultural inputs received on credit from the state are sometimes sold 
and peasants often attempt to circumvent both state credit and marketing 
authorities at the point of sale. 
In theory, the state's agents in the villages should be preventing all of 
this from happening. However, in spite of villagization, there is still a real 
difference in capital's ability to subordinate household as opposed to wage 
labor.16 To go beyond exerting indirect quality and quantity controls, one 
must know who in a village is producing what and how his crop is faring. 
Without this knowledge, it becomes difficult to deal with the "undisciplined" 
peasant laborer who may claim that his crop has failed and that he can't pay 
for inputs he has received on credit, when in fact he has simply sold his 
produce outside the official marketing authorities. In villages where plots 
are not II bega kwa bega 11 ( shoulder to shoulder) or the village is more of a 
legal euphemism, the state and its agents--whether village governments, 
officials from the Tanzania Rural Development Bank, or employees of the crop 
authorities--may find it difficult to supervise peasant producers. This 
difficulty is compounded where distances are vast, manpower shortages are 
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great, and transport is poor. It is further accentuated by the fact that many 
of the state's own officials--including extension officers--find villages 
extremely unattractive places to be and go there as infrequently as possible. 
The same goes for a number of village officials, including village 
bookkeepers, many of whom use their training to find other positions and 
escape the drudgery of village life. The creation of Village Managers 
( responsible to the Prime Ministers Office rather than to the villages) was 
the state's answer to on-the-spot supervision. To date, however, many Village 
Managers have found ways of either evading or leaving their posts. In 
addition, when the state's agents do arrive they cannot necessarily be counted 
on to accumulate on the state's rather than on their own behalf. Hence, there 
are peasants who pay off village officials to close their eyes to certain 
practices, members of crop authorities who misappropriate inputs received from 
the Tanzanian Rural Development Bank for their own farms, village officials 
who short weigh peasants' produce and syphon off the rest for themselves, and 
so on. 
The Tanzanian situation simply confirms Lenin's observations that where 
the social relations of production "are still poorly developed" and "the 
accumulation of capital, concomitant with the ruination of the producers is 
negligible," 
This only leads to cruder, serf forms of exploitation ••• where 
capital, not yet able to subjugate the worker directly, by the 
mere purchase of his labor-power at its value, enmeshes him in a 
veritable net of usurious extortion, binds him to itself by 
kulak methods, and as a result robs him not only of the 
surplus-value, but of an enormous part of his wages, too, .•. 
grinds him down by preventing him from changing his "master," 
and humiliates him by compelling him to regard as a boon the 
fact that capital "gives" work (Lenin, I: 216). 
Where capitalism is least developed, the way is then open for "small huck-
sters" and the "mass of small rural exploiters," whom Lenin called "blood-
suckers" (Lenin, I: 235-236). 
It is clear then that there is an enormous gap between the theory and the 
reality of labor's subordination to capital in Tanzania, irrespective of 
villagization. However, it is not sufficient simply to describe the 
insubordination of labor to capital in Tanzania. Much of what appears from the 
standpoint of the state to be be nothing more than sheer indiscipline on the 
part of peasant labor is the response of the middle peasantry to its 
increasing inability to reproduce itself. Villagization (at least as it exists 
today) effectively attempts to institutionalize the contradictions of small, 
poorly developed capitalism and thereby restrict the real subordination of 
labor to capital. It attempts to inhibit the development of conditions which 
would permit a further transformation of the productive forces and to restrict 
the further socialization of labor through full proletarianization. In some 
cases, this situation increases the extraction of absolute surplus value 
(surplus value produced by the prolongation of the working day) and pushes the 
intensification of labor to its natural limit. When this point is reached, 
crops are sometimes abandoned, as there is neither sufficient labor nor 
transport to complete the cultivation or harvesting of the crop. At this 
point, levels of nutrition and levels of health tend to decline (Fortmann, 
1976: 26), and the returns to labor are increasingly negative. The more inputs 
that are necessary for the production of a particular crop and the smaller the 
holding, the more likely it is that peasants will experience pauperization. In 
Tanzania, small-scale production within villages has set clear limits on the 
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introduction of machinery and other economies of scale. It has sanctified the 
hoe and the principle that small is beautiful, while simultaneously forcing 
peasants to produce for exchange value and for use value, which necessitates 
using inputs that theoretically increase the productivity of labor, but 
nevertheless demand mere labor time than is available within the household. 
Given the Tanzanian state's attempt to institutionalize the middle 
peasantry and to prohibit rural proletarianization, a policy which has 
received the support of international capital (OECD, 109), the tendency 
towards pauperization within villages calls forth other results also predicted 
by Lenin. More backward and more exploitative relations of production reassert 
themselves. These include a) labor-intensive public works schemes in which 
labor is paid below its value by the state, with the justification that it is 
a supplementary income, and b) the emergence of feudal relations of production 
within villages in which poor peasants work as quasi-wage labor for richer 
peasants, or those who have land close to their dwellings sublet it to those 
whose land is far away. These "remnants of feudalism in agriculture" (Lenin, 
IV: 99), this informal wage labor is more exploitative than real wage labor, 
as it both strips labor of all protection and results overall in the 
decreasing socialization of labor. As Lenin and Kautsky both noted, "It is 
precisely the peasant's property that is the main cause of his impoverishment 
and his degradation •••• The protection of the peasantry is not protection from 
poverty, but the protection that chains the peasant to his property" (Lenin, 
IV: 98, 99). 
From one perspective, villagization in Tanzania makes a mockery of the 
independence of the smallholder and renders his alleged independence a mere 
formality vis-a-vis capital (Banaji, 1977: 33). The use of inputs and the 
increase in quality and quantity controls demanded by both the state and 
international capital set the terms under which commodities can be sold and 
produced. Furthermore, however badly and unevenly it is done, labor power 
within villages is supervised, controlled and directed by the state. 
Nevertheless, the words "mockery" and "formality" are to some extent 
misleading. The formality of smallholding does represent a genuine impediment 
to· the further development of capitalism in agriculture and hence to the 
realization of relative surplus value as opposed to absolute surplus value. 
The institutionalization of the middle peasantry represents an obstacle to the 
further development of capitalism in agriculture as it inhibits full 
proletarianization and hence not only the further development of labor, but of 
capital and commodity relations as well. The state and its ruling class have 
effectively institutionalized backward capitalism: a capitalism which reduces 
peasants to labor power without any of the benefits of fully socialized wage 
labor, a capitalism which precludes technical transformation beyond a certain 
point and insures the perpetuation of absolute surplus value, a capitalism 
which confines labor and capital to their most primitive states resulting in 
overwork and underconsumption at the level of the household, and a capitalism 
where overall increases in surplus value depend on expanding the number of 
middle-peasant, commodity-producing households rather than transforming the 
value of labor power itself. 
Capital 
Nevertheless, in spite of its backwardness, the capital which is acting 
upon middle peasant households cannot be viewed as the archaic form of 
merchant capital. Merchant capital is characterized by the fact that it 
operates solely in the sphere of exchange between two spheres of production, 
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that it exploits through robbery and unequal exchange, that it does not create 
value, and that it is therefore capable of destroying, but incapable of 
transforming the mode of production itself (Marx, IB:-, Chs. 18, 20; Kay, 1975: 
96-124). It cannot transform the productivity of labor or the value of labor 
power itself, because merchant capital does not create value. In contrast to 
the period of merchant capital, capital in Tanzania has entered the sphere of 
production. Furthermore, in Tanzania the expansion of middle peasant 
households producing cash crops has been set in motion by the reentry of 
international capital. In contrast to merchant capital, international finance 
(in particular, World Bank) capital has entered the sphere of production 
through the state as the agent of industrial capital, with tendencies to 
extract relative surplus value, through the use of improved inputs, which 
increase the productivity of labor by extending commmodity relations, and by 
acting to raise producer prices.17 However these are only tendencies, which 
are inhibited by a number of factors. First, there are real limitations in 
attempting to transform the value of labor power within the confines of 
smallholding and where labor power is not a free commodity. From one 
perspective, the use of inputs in agriculture appears to be an aspect of the 
real subordination of labor to capital and hence of the extraction of relative 
as opposed to absolute suplus value. It signals a partial "transformation of 
production by the conscious use of mechanics, chemistry, etc. (Mandel, Marx, 
Capital, I: 1036). As such it changes the labor process itself and acts to 
introduce a transformation in the value of labor power as well. However, the 
use of improved inputs, the introduction of quality and quantity controls, and 
the increased "directing, superintending and adjusting" (Marx, Capital I: 330) 
of household labor by state officials without other transformations in the 
social relations of production, the scale of production, or the productive 
forces themselves tends to result in the intensification of labor, in overwork 
and underconsumption, and the extraction of asbsolute surplus va1ue. More 
important, as Marx noted, "an increase in the productivity of labor in those 
branches of industry which supply neither the necessary means of subsistence 
nor the means by which they are produced leaves the value of labor power 
undisturbed ••• " (Mandel, Marx, Capital I: 432). In addition, 
to make the value of labor-power go down, the rise in the 
productivity of labor must seize upon those branches of industry 
whose products determine the value of labor-power, and 
consequently either belong to the category of normal means of 
subsistence, or are capable of replacing them (Mandel, Marx, 
Capital I: 432). 
Such a situation would be most likely to occur if commodity relations were 
well developed and household producers purchased rather than produced their 
means of subsistence. Neither is the case in Tanzania. Furthermore, if 
increases in productivity and consequent reductions in necessary labor time to 
produce subsistence commodities are not passed on to the household producers, 
the result is pauperization (Cowen, 1980:6). One manifestation of this in 
Tanzania is the relative increase in the margin between international and 
producer prices and the worsening condition of the smallholder (MDB, 1977). 
At a certain point the theoretical interests of international finance 
capital and the class character of the state appear to conflict. The former is 
primarily interested in lowering the value of labor power as a means of 
insuring the continuous production of exchange value by the peasantry. 
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However, international capital is not omnipotent. It is confined by an 
existing organization of production that predated its reentry (i.e. the 
attempt by the state to expand the middle peasantry at the expense of 
bourgeoisie and proletariat) and is inhibited by its own interest in fore-
stalling the politically destabilizing effects of an unemployed rural labor 
force, where "the modern sector of the economoy is not creating enough 
employment opportunities to absorb a growing labor force" (OECD, 109). In 
short, as O'Laughlin notes, it is important 
not to assume that all which exists represents the optimal 
functional interests of capital as a class •••• Only if we 
assume that a social system is ordered by a single 
non-contradictory principle (e.g. the requirements of 
capital) can this task be reduced to explaining why things 
are not what they are not. In the case of capitalism this 
would be a singularly inappropriate assumption, for it is a 
system racked by conflict between capital and labor and by 
competitions between capitals and national units of capital 
(O'Laughlin 1977: 31). 
In contrast to international capital, the so-called "bureaucratic 
bourgeoiseie" on the other hand is under pressure to pay back its loans and 
improve its foreign exchange earnings, while simultaneously reproducing and 
transforming itself as a class. Given its class character and the fact that 
peasant suplus is almost its sole vehicle of accumulation, it appears at times 
to plunder household producers by paying them below their value and applying 
coercive sanctions. Although capital has entered the sphere of production, its 
ability to transform significantly the value of labor power is inhibited by 
smallholding itself, leaving much outside the direct control of the state. It 
is this plundering and the limitations of subordinating middle peasant 
households to capital, which gives the state the appearance of mimicking 
merchant capital, although it has very definitely entered the sphere of 
production. However, as Marx noted, it is not uncommon for the "capital of the 
usurer" and "merchant capital" to "survive and reproduce themselves as 
transitional subforms within the framwork of capitalist production" (Mandel, 
Marx, Capital, I: 1023). Both indicate the low level of labor's subordination 
to capital. 
Formal Subordination and Primitive Accumulation 
In Tanzania, the classic process of primitive accumulation described by 
Marx has not occurrect.18 The peasantry has not been expropriated from the 
land and this has indeed limited both the formal and the real subordination of 
peasant labor to capital. Capital has entered the sphere of production through 
the vehicle of newly created nucleated villages in which indi victual peasants 
retain individual holdings, but are nevertheless subject to directions and 
controls by state officials. The village approximates the factory in some 
respects; however, the small size of the holdings, their formal retention by 
smallholders, and the concomitant limitations on the introduction of machinery 
and the transformation of the value of labor power, makes the analogy a 
limited one. Furthermore, labor power itself is not a full commodity, as the 
state frowns on the hiring-in of wage labor, curtails peasants' freedom of 
movement and has reintroduced minimum acreage requirements from the 1930s, 
compelling smallholders to produce for exchange value. Middle peasants have 
been partially expropriated by the state as simple commodity producers 
following their forcible removal from their original homes into nucleated 
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villages created and run by the state. But to regard this forcible 
expropriation of the peasantry as akin to what Marx called "primitive 
accumulation" would seem to be straining Marx to the breaking point (Marx, 
Capital I: 714). What appears to be happening in Tanzania is that peasant 
labor is gradually losing its autonomy in the sense described by Banaji, but 
has not yet been totally separated from its means of production in the sense 
maintained by Marx. 
Within this context, villagization in Tanzania represents the "enlargement 
of scale" Marx felt was critical to the subordination of labor to capital 
(Mandel, Marx, Capital I: 1022). By formal subordination or subsumption, Marx 
is referring to the reorganization of labor in one place under the direction 
of one capital, a process that was synonymous with the period of manufacturing 
in Europe. The word formal is used by Marx to dramatize the fact that during 
this period in the development of capitalism, "capital subsumes the labor 
process as it finds it, that is to say it takes over an existing labor 
process, 11 "a pre-existing mode of labor" (Mandel, Marx, Capital I:1021). The 
word formal is also used to contrast this period to a later period in which 
the real subordination of labor takes place and the "actual mode of labor and 
the real nature of the labor process as a whole" (Mandel, Marx, Capital I: 
1021) are revolutionized through the introduction of machinery and the 
application of science. In the period of formal subsumption Marx notes that 
the actual labor process is not revolutionized; "all that changes is that 
compulsion is applied" (Mandel, Marx, Capital I: 1025). 
The work may become more intensive, its duration may be 
extended, it may become more continuous or orderly under the eye 
of the interested capitalist, but in themselves these changes do 
not affect the character of the actual labor process, the actual 
mode of working (Mandel, Marx, Capital I: 1021). 
Consequently during the period of formal subordination surplus value "can 
be created only by lengthening the working day, i.e. by increasing absolute 
surplus value," in contrast to the period of real subordination which extracts 
surplus value by means of transforming the productivity of labor, through 
revolutionizing the productive forces; that is, by means of relative surplus 
value (Mandel, Marx, Capital I: 1021). 
In discussing the process of formal subsumption and its effect on the 
commodity labor power, Marx notes that "the more completely [the] conditions 
of labor [the means of production and the means of subsistence] are mobilized 
against him as alien property, the more effectively the formal relationship 
between capital and wage labor is established" (Mandel, Marx, Capital I: 1026). 
In Tanzania, the level of formal suborination is still very low. In 
discussing the period of formal subsumption, Marx assumed that the producer 
would already have been separated from his means of production--in short, that 
primitive accumulation would already have ocurred in its classic form. However 
if the middle peasant in Tanzania can no longer be described as "independent," 
it is important to note that the "conditions of labor" have also not been 
totally "mobilized against him as alien property. 11 Production to reproduce the 
means of subsistence is both necessary and possible. Market relations are too 
poorly developed for most peasants to buy what they eat. Furthermore, producer 
prices received by middle peasants do not cover the cost of total repro-
duction. Middle peasants are paid below their value. As one FAQ report 
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noted, "for the most part returns to the peasant are extremely low when 
compared with minimum wage rates, despite the significant price increases of 
the past three years" (MDB, 1977: 5). This constant uncertainty of market 
relations and changing producer prices simultaneously encourages and forces 
the household producer to adopt private insurance schemes against the state. 
One of the these includes producing for consumption as well as for exchange, 
even beyond the calls of necessity as food crops (unlike cash crops) can be 
eaten, hoarded, or sold on the black market. Production for consumption 
effectively allows the state to insulate producer prices from the cost of 
reproduction and to pay peasants below their value. The necessity to use 
inputs for cash crops often pushes household labor time to its limits 
(Fortmann, 1976: 31), resulting in losses in production and decreases in 
marketable output. Furthermore, when smallholding forces the intercropping of 
certan food and cash crops, proper spacing requirements often cannot be 
maintained, certain herbicides which would be good for one crop but not the 
other cannot be used, and output declines. The result is relative loss and 
pauperization as the household attempts to make ends meet, thereby supporting 
Cowen' s point that "the attempt by households to act as if they possessed 
relative autonomy to counter the coercive forces of the market only moves 
households towards relative pauperization" (Cowen, 1977, Part III: 18) .19 At 
the level of the state, the results are stagnating and declining levels of 
production (MDB Vol. 1, 1977: 2), which can only be compensated for by 
increasing the number of households engaged in the production of a particular 
cash crop to offset the national losses in surplus appropriation which result 
from losses at the individual level. Furthermore, as long as the state 
organizes production around middle peasant households and thereby inhibits any 
significant transformation in the value of labor power, the main tool used to 
extract greater surplus value from the peasantry will be the tool of formal 
subsumption: compulsion. 
Tobacco Production 
An examination of tobacco production in Tanzania demonstrates how middle 
peasant household producers are being squeezed and pauperized by this backward 
capitalist system. 20 Tobacco demands more inputs than any other cash crop 
grown in Tanzania (MDB, Annex 7, September 1978: 14) and an enormous number of 
quality and quantity controls. Household labor time is thereby pushed beyond 
its limits, a tendency accentuated by the limits smallholding poses to 
mechanization or to other economies of scale. This pressure on household labor 
time plus the many constraints that exist on the hiring-in of wage labor lead 
to cutbacks in certain essential operations that eventually result in overall 
losses in output for the indi victual producer. This situation of less than 
optimal output coupled with low producer prices and poorly developed commodity 
relations effectively forces households to produce use values (that is, their 
means of subsistence) as well as exchange values. This, in turn, puts 
additional pressure on household labor time leading to overwork, 
underconsumption, and a further exacerbation of each point mentioned above. 
Until the 1960s, large expatriate estates and "ten-acre farmers" produced 
most of Tanzania• a tobacco. There were few African smallholders. Entry into 
production was restricted and carefully monitored, sometimes through outgrower 
arrangements. Since independence, production patterns have shifted 
dramatically. Now approximately 46,000 smallholders with an average of O. 5 
hectares per grower produce over 75 percent of Tanzania's tobacco, with the 
remaining 25 percent coming from 60 expatriate estates in Iringa Region. 
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Boesen maintains "the social differentiation between tobacco growers is now 
less than it has ever been" (Boesen, (a), 4). With this numerical expansion in 
both growers and land under tobacco, wet leaf production increased from 2.2 
thousand tons in 1963/64 to a high of 19,144 tons in 1976/77. Since then gross 
production has declined to 18,233 tons in 1977/78. The production of fire and 
burley tobacco has declined while the flue cured has remained steady but 
without further growth at 14,600 tons (MDB, Annex 7, September 1978: 1-3). 
Although gross tobacco production and the returns to the state have 
increased rapidly in the last several years, the same is not true for 
smallholders. Returns per hectare/per grower have fallen, with decreases in 
output per hectare/per grower and increases in the cost of inputs per 
hectare/per grower, which are received on credit from the Tanzanian Rural 
Development Bank (TRDB) and the Tobacco Authority of Tanzania (TAT). The state 
has increasingly acted like merchant capital, appropriating through unequal 
exchange, as the margin between the world market price and the producer price 
has increased by 50 percent to the detriment of the latter. The "steady upward 
trend in world market prices" and 11the recruitment of more farmers" into 
tobacco production (MDB, Annex 7, September 1978: 17) are what explain the 
enormous increases in gross production and returns to the state rather than 
any further real subordinaton and appropriation by means of relative surplus 
value. As another restatement of this point, it is worth noting that 
while the average yield potential on one hectare is 1,200 kg of 
wet leaf per ha, the farmer loses 10 percent of his crop to lack 
of barn capacity; 10 percent to loss in the barn through impure 
curing techniques; 25 percent in inefficient bulking and grading 
operations mainly because of leaking roofs, poor construction or 
lack of grading sheds (MDB, Annex 7, September 1978: 14; my 
emphasis ) • 
The squeeze experienced by middle peasants engaged in tobacco production 
manifests itself as drops in quality and yield per grower, heavy losses at 
every stage of the production process, low 21 and sometimes negative returns 
to the producer, high arrears in the repayment of credit, complete abandonment 
of the crop midway in the production cycle due to constraints on labor, and 
shifts away from tobacco into maize production. The reasons for this squeeze 
stem both from the inherent limits on formal and real subordination within the 
confines of middle peasant production and from the poor development of the 
state in the sphere of circulation and its tendency to mimic merchant capital. 
The squeeze experienced by middle peasants is experienced more 
dramatically in tobacco production than in some other commodities because it 
demands a heavier investment of inputs than other crops, it requires 
comparatively more labor and skills than other commodities, the average 
hectarage per grower is too small to obtain the "optimal growth path of output 
and capital accumulation" (Feldmans, 1969:7) which cannot be realized on 
holdings that are under ten acres, and because it consists of a number of 
stages where any cutbacks in constant or variable capital increases the 
potential for loss. 
The inputs used in tobacco are fertilizer, "seedbed packs (containing 
insecticides, fungicides and seeds), packing material (tarline paper, jute 
twine, and hessian cloth) and barn flues in the case of fire cured tobacco" 
(MDB, Annes 7, September 1978: 19). An initial investment is required to clear 
the land and to build curing barns and grading sheds. Furthermore, in the case 
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of fire cured tobacco, peasants must must also pay for the transportaiton of 
firewood or haul it on their backs. Although there is a 50 percent subsidy on 
inputs, the Tobacco Authority of Tanzania actually reimburses the Government 
for the inputs and then deducts them from the world price, thereby lowering 
the producer price. Effectively then, there is no real subsidy to the direct 
producer 22(MDB, Annex 7, September 1978: 22). Furthermore, since the 
mid-1960s, the cost of tobacco inputs as a percentage of gross income has 
risen from 20 percent to as much as 50 percent (Boesen, 1977: 20). As of the 
1977/78 year, the Tobacco Authority distributed some inputs free; however, the 
decrease in costs per grower amounted to only fifty shillings ( MDB, Annex 7, 
September 1978: 25). 
At the same time the cost of inputs has increased, the producer price 
hardly changed from 1971/72 to 1974/75. Since then, the producer price has 
risen, but only by a very little (MDB, Annex 7, September 1978: 10). Overall, 
from 1970-1976, the export price for fire-cured tobacco increased by 13 
percent and the producer price by only 9 percent, while for the flue-cured 
tobacco, the figures were 8 percent and 4 percent (TRDB: 10). Furthermore, as 
Boesen notes, "the producer price finally reached the 1965 level again in 
1975, but at the simultaneous speed of general inflation this did not even 
maintain the real value of one kilogram of tobacco compared with 1970" 
(Boesen, 1977: 14). In short, while the cost of inputs has increased, real 
prices have decreased, making it more difficult to reproduce the means of 
subsistence from tobacco earnings alone, One response to this squeeze has been 
for middle peasants to divert tobacco inputs to maize to insure themselves a 
regular supply of food. Also, because the returns to labor per hectare are 
higher in maize than in tobacco (for example, it takes four times as much 
labor per hectare to produce tobacco as maize), the diversion has sometimes 
gone beyond what would be strictly necessary to reproduce the means of 
subsistence. This diversion of inputs may in part explain both the decrease in 
yields per hectare experienced by smallholders, 23 as tobacco is an extremely 
vulnerable crop highly responsive to changes in inputs, and the tendency in 
some cases for tobacco production to be abandoned midway in the cycle. The 
vulnerability of tobacco has increased further following villagization, since 
more inputs are needed to eliminate fungi when continuous cul ti vat ion is 
practiced. 
Tobacco production is especially arduous on smallholdings. The use of 
inputs, plus the skills demanded in the various stages of production require 
more labor than other commodities and become more costly when the size of the 
holdings are reduced to less than a few acres. As the Feldmans have noted, 
Flue cured tobacco is a very difficult crop to grow, 
process, and prepare for the market •• ,. New farmers 
experience considerable difficulties in learning the skills 
that are needed. The first three or four years of tobacco 
production are a process of "learning by doing" for the new 
farmers. During this period ••• the amount of tobacco they 
can handle is restricted •••• The restrictions on the acreage 
grown by each farmer that have been described are paralled 
by significant economies of scale, i.e. reduced input per 
unit of output, as planned output (measured in acres grown) 
is increased, These economies of scale arise from the 
increasing di vision of labor that can be applied to a 
number of the separate processes that are involved in 
tobacco production. (Feldmans, 1969: 11) 
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No such economies of scale have been realized in tobacco production in 
Tanzania, outside of the large expatriate extates in Iringa. Cooperative 
curing barns exist; however, more commonly an individual has his own. 
Holdings are too small for mechanization, which could both "relieve labor 
constraints" and "provide a standardized method of carrying out indi victual 
farm operations" (Feldmans, 1969: 11). 
Instead, as holdings have become smaller and more inputs are used, more 
man days per acre are needed to perform the same task (Feldmans, 1969: Tables 
III and IV:7). Along with increased labor demands per acre as holdings have 
become smaller, producers increasingly have had to rely on household labor 
alone. Formerly, tobacco farmers "whether they farmed in groups or 
individually, hired substantial numbers of laborers for harvesting, curing, 
grading and packing tobacco" (Feldmans, 1969:10). Their ability to hire in 
wage labor at peak periods depended on cash loans, which they received from 
the state midway in the production cycle. These loans were used to pay wage 
labor and to purchase the means of subsistence for both household and wage 
labor. In 1973, these cash loans were abandoned and it became impossible for 
most households to hire in wage labor.24 One hectare of tobacco takes 300 
man days per annum, with peak labor demands at certain times of the year. 
Family labor tends to be around 3.2 members per household which is 
insufficient, especially during peak periods. Furthermore, with no cash 
subsidies, increased costs in production, and declining real incomes, 
households must now grow food rather than purchase it to reproduce the means 
of subsistence. 
The result in the first instance has been to intensify the production of 
labor, to dramatically increase the extraction of absolute surplus, and to 
reinstitutionalize middle peasants who neither hire in nor hire out. However, 
when the extraction of absolute surplus value reaches its limits and middle 
peasants can no longer reproduce themselves, other more backward social 
relations of production reassert themselves. In this regard, Boesen notes that: 
seasonal employment work on piecework terms has increased 
and so has a variety of arrangements close to some kind of 
semi-tenancy •.•• Under such an arrangement a new immigrant 
cultivates his own fields, but is given tobacco seedlings 
and inputs by an established grower who also cures tobacco 
once it is harvested and sells the tobacco in his name. The 
"tenant" however, gets the money for the bales he has 
delivered, sometimes with a deduction for the imputs. The 
tenant may also receive some maize from the established 
grower to feed him until he can start to harvest his own 
maize. In return for all this the "tenant" has to do a more 
or less specified amount of work during the season for the 
established grower who has "helped" him. (Boesen, 1977: 
31-32). 
As in other parts of the world, there is nothing romantic about semi-
feudal arrangements in Tanzania, and Fortmann has observed that "casual 
landless laborers have the hardest lot" (Fortmann, 1978 (c): 3). While one 
might object that middle peasants who experience difficulties reproducing 
themselves are not landless, it becomes clear that the peasant's land--once he 
has been forced to become a tenant to reproduce himself--is a mere formality 
which simply masks the inherent tendency towards proletarianization among 
poorer middle peasants. At present, it is impossible to know the extent of 
tenancy or any other informal arrangement which has arisen to avert 
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pauperization, However, in places like Urambo, where "net-real income per 
grower has fallen from a level beyond the present day income of a middle level 
civil servant to less than the minimum wage" (Boesen, 1977: 21.) one could 
hazard that tenancy might be on the increase. 
The tendency among the middle peasantry towards depeasantization and 
pauperization is experienced more dramatically in tobacco production because 
the crop is fragile and its production consists of a number of stages where 
any modifications or cutbacks in constant and/or variable capital increases 
the potential for loss. At many points during production and marketing, 
individual producers are dependent on state organizations outside the village 
including the Tobacco Authority of Tanzania and the Tanzanian Rural 
Development Bank, Inputs which must be imported sometimes do not arrive on 
time for a variety of reasons: because the order is not placed early enough, 
because of problems experienced by the exporter, or because of the constant 
congestion in the port of Dar es Salaam. Once inputs are delayed, for whatever 
reason, the result may be delays in planting, curing, or marketing. Even when 
inputs are available, transport, roads and manpower may all be inadequate to 
insure timely deliveries and proper storage, 
TAT is responsible for transporting firewood to tobacco villages; however, 
often it does not do so, leaving indi victual farmers to perform their own 
cutting and hauling. Hence the tendency is to use too little firewood in the 
curing process, thereby increasing the likelihood of loss and reducing the 
quality (the grade) of the tobacco produced, Although TAT is supposed to pick 
up the cured tobacco from village baling sheds several times a week, there are 
often delays of up to several weeks, Most villages do not have adequate 
storage facilities, and the tobacco is often ruined as a result of these 
delays, Furthermore, once tobacco is sold, producers may not get paid for up 
to three months, due to delays in accounting between TAT and TRDB. Even then, 
the returns are only 40 percent of the total purchase price, as 60 percent is 
automatically deducted to repay for the inputs which have been received on 
credit, Farmers have been known to ask "what urban workers would do without 
three months salaries" (Interview, 1978) and more and more are switching to 
maize where one gets paid at the point of sale, 
Parastatals such as TAT not only operate within the sphere of circulation, 
but also through extension agents, green leaf managers etc., who are supposed 
to enter the sphere of production to aid in the extraction of surplus value. 
However, the kind of close supervision, training of producers, and quality 
controls which are necessary, and which existed prior to the expansion of 
smallholder production (Boesen, 1977; Feldman, 1969), simply have not 
occurred, irrespective of the intentions behind the villagization program or 
the World Bank's tobacco schemes. In short, the state and its agents enter the 
sphere of production unevenly and badly, tending to mimic merchant capital, 
Losses occur in yet other stages of the production process. These losses 
exacerbate the squeeze experienced by tobacco producers, are themselves 
symptomatic of the poverty of middle peasant producers, and derive from the 
contradictions of simultaneously attempting to extract greater surplus value 
while confining capitalism to household production and hence its most 
primitive state. Peasants are thus constantly forced to make a series of 
"Hobson' s choices, 11 which are attempts to compensate for both insufficient 
capital and labor. These attempts cannot surmount the contradictions of 
backward capitalism and hence tend to result in overwork and underconsumption 
as well as losses at every stage of the production process. 
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Where the soil is not perfect, more fungicides and fertilizers are needed. 
If these inputs are diverted to maize production ( to produce food), both the 
quality and quantity of the green leaf tobacco produced are affected. If they 
are not diverted, maize yields per hectare decline and so does the amount of 
food. Curing is also a very painstaking process, where every detail affects 
the final outcome. Tobacco must be picked on the same day it is cured. 
However, if an individual's curing barn is too small, as it often is (Boesen, 
1977), farmers may wait up to seven days before curing the leaf, by which time 
a great deal of green leaf will already have been lost. If the green leaf is 
left in the fields and not picked until there is more space, there may also be 
losses. Curing itself demands a great deal of firewood, which generally 
depends on peasants being their own mules. In many cases, villages are far 
away from the source of the wood and to cut down on labor time, producers use 
less firewood than what is recommended for curing. Then, if tobacco has been 
undercured, it rots. If on the other hand, the curing barn is badly made 
(again because of constraints on labor or capital), other types of loss can 
occur through overheating or inadequate superv1.s1.on. Given the many 
conflicting demands on household labor time, this should hardly be surprising, 
as the mere supervision of the curing process can take up to eight hours. 
Furthermore, once it is cured, the tobacco must be hung on sticks to soften 
the dry leaf, If the storage facilities are poor, the dry leaf can either rot 
because of excessive moisture or again turn to dust if the reverse is the 
problem. Most smallholders' barns and storage facilities are too small, badly 
constructed, and wasteful in terms of the way they use heat. Consequently, 
small curing barns necessitate a greater input of firewood and hence more 
labor time. Furthermore, middle peasants can hardly be expected to build 
larger and better barns and storage facilities. They neither have the capital 
nor the promise of large enough returns to risk taking credit for such 
purposes. In short then, the high losses experienced by middle peasants during 
the various stages of tobacco production are symptomatic of a situation in 
which labor and capital have been confined to their most primitive states. 
Furthermore, at the level of the state, the costs of administering small-
holder production also appear to be increasing. The "trading profit" (the 
sales proceeds minus the production and marketing costs) is decreasing, and 
once the administrative costs of TAT are deducted, there is actually a deficit 
(MDB, Annex 7, September 178: 31,33). Bank charges and interest for a 
"constant overdraft of some shs. 150 million" represent TAT' s largest 
administrative expense, with the second largest item being "salaries and 
wages" (MDB, Annex 7, September 1978:37). Hence, it would be rather difficult 
to say whether the crisis of state accumulation is due primarily to the 
contradictions of middle peasant household production, attempts at capital 
accumulation by TAT officials or both. Certainly, static or declining 
accumulation is a classic feature of backward capitalism, a fact which was 
noted by both Lenin and Kautsky. It seems equally likely, however, that on an 
individual level, officials would use their position in the state either to 
reconstitute themselves as more secure members of their own class or to 
transform their class position completely. 
Boesen notes that "the larger farms of the 1960s had started some 
mechanization, division of labor, specialization, etc., but on the later 
predominant small peasant farms, there is very little scope for such further 
development of the productive forces, once the 'jump' to small-scale tobacco 
production has been made" (Boesen, (a): 5). Although both communal production 
and a transformation of the means of production are in theory feasible, in 
~ villages where individual block holdings are next to each other, previous 
attempts in that direction were unsuccesful and have been abandoned. Given 
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past dislocations in production which have occurred because of villagization, 
it seems unlikely that Tanzania's ruling class would risk the economic and 
political repercussions that would result from collectivization. Furthermore, 
given the heavy dependence on Western capital and the risks involved in 
dismantling the myth of "democratic socialism" in Tanzania ( still popular 
among liberal academics), such a path seems even more unlikely. If one takes 
the example of tobacco, one can see that from the standpoint of international 
capital, the institutionalization of the middle peasantry has not exactly been 
unprofitable, as total tobacco exports have climbed from 7,137 in 1972 to 
11,737 in 1977 (MDB, Annex 7, September 1978: 5). At present, the expansion of 
the number of housholds engaged in tobacco production is in a sense 
compensating for the losses experienced at the level of the producer. It seems 
unlikely that this can be anything more than a stopgap measure, given the 
contradictions of middle peasant household production, its tendency towards 
pauperization, and the inherent impossibility of attempting to stabilize the 
middle against the extremes within the confines of capitalist development. 
Conclusion 
If Marx made one point clear in his discussions of capital, it was that 
the development of capitalism depended on the existence of free wage labor 
which sold itself on the market as a commodity. Labor power would itself 
become a saleable commodity only when it was separated from its means of 
subsistence, when it no longer had access to the means of production, and when 
it was forced to sell itself on the market for a wage to obtain its means of 
subsistence by purchased commodities and thereby to reproduce itself as a 
saleable commodity. In Marx's view, it was only when capital and labor power 
were separate commodities on the market, meeting as permanent buyers and 
sellers, that the capitalist mode of production could become dominant, that 
commodity production would become generalized, and the law of value would rule 
competition between capitals and hence society as a whole. As long as labor 
possessed the means of production and could reproduce itself by producing the 
means of subsistence, the development of the capitalist mode of production 
would be inhibited. Land and other means of production could not be 
concentrated as long as they were atomized, thereby limiting the available 
capital and limiting the degree to which the productive forces could be 
developed and mechanization introduced. Most important, this also limited the 
need to transform the productivity of labor and to extract by means of 
relative surplus value in order to stay alive as a competitive capital. In 
short, as long as capital itself was atomized, could not be concentrated, and 
could only compete within certain well-defined limits, the development of the 
capitalist mode of production would of necessity be inhibited. If the 
peasantry had not yet been separated from the land, labor and capital could 
not meet as free agents on the market. Briefly put, generalized commodity 
production could not occur under such circumstances. As long as this was the 
case, as long as labor and capital were atomized, neither could be combined in 
its most technically advanced state nor would they be forced to. The pain of 
extinction that would threaten competitive capitals meeting in the market 
place that had produced at greater than the socially necessary cost of labor 
would not arise. There would be no necessary compulsion to produce 
commodities at their socially necessary cost. Hence, there would be no reason 
to transform the value of labor power by increasing the productivity of labor, 
by decreasing necessary relative to surplus labor time, and by reducing the 
value of labor power through a generalized increase in labor productivity, a 
reduction in necessary labor time and hence in the value of the commodities 
that are necessary to reproduce the commodity labor power. 
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The Tanzanian experience demonstrates once again that "populism when put 
into practice can only be a blind alley" (Byres, 1979: 240). The "Tanzanian 
way" initially appealed to those who falsely believe that there is a middle 
way between capitalism and socialism that avoids both the horrors of 
industrialization and the necessity for class struggle. However, the law of 
value knows no middle way. Consequently, the result of attempting to 
institutionalize the middle peasantry against the extremes is not to surmount 
the law of value, but to cement backward capitalism. Hence, like the 
manufacture, handicraft, and domestic industries which stood "in the rear" 
(Marx, Capital I:490) of modern industry and which "long ago reproduced and 
even out[did] all the horrors of the factory system without participating in 
any of the elements of social progress it contains" (Marx, Capital I; 474), 
production organized around the middle peasantry stands to the rear of modern 
agriculture. As Kautsky noted, 
A holding which cannot compete on a technically superior 
basis is forced to exact the maximum effort from its 
workers. On the other hand, a holding where workers can be 
driven to any limit does not require the latest equipment, 
as do holdings where workers impose limits on the intensity 
of their labor. The possibility of increasing the labor 
time of a given work force is a serious obstacle to 
technical progress. The intensification of labor on the 
peasant holding independently of any moral or other 
constraint cannot pass for an advantage of small scale 
production even from the purely economic scale (Banaji, 
Kautsky, 1976: 26). 
Furthermore, the institutionalization of the middle peasantry effectively 
stymies the class struggle as it effectively atomizes both capital and labor. 
Populists who purport to be lovers of the "people" and in particular of a 
nonexistent classless peasantry should note that Tanzania's partially 
dispossessed middle peasantry, described so well in theoretical terms by 
Banaji, is kept from even organizing against the capital which exploits it on 
a daily basis because formally speaking it is not wage labor. Hence, another 
effect of Tanzania's brand of Narodnik populism is to insulate capital from 
labor and consequently from the class struggle. It is therefore not surprising 
that both indigenous ruling classes and various forms of international capital 
see the expansion of middle peasant households as a means of averting a number 
of political problems normally associated with the extraction of surplus 
value--in particular, the appearance of unemployed, potentially rebellious 
surplus populations in the cities. 
Finally, Tanzania's initial philosophy of national II self-reliance" appeals 
to a variant of third worldist populism, which attacks big, and in particular 
foreign capital, while advocating a kind of anti-industrial autarchy, 
epitomized by the institutionalization of the middle peasantry and its "small 
is beautiful" philosophical underpinning. However, small is not beautiful. The 
expansion of middle peasant commodity producing households in Tanzania rests 
on and perpetuates the extraction of absolute surplus value while virtually 
precluding the transformation of the value of labor power and the extraction 
of relative surplus value. The result is what is sometimes incorrectly called 
"unequal exchange" at the level of international market. Correctly speaking, 
what is occurring is equal exchange for values which have been produced under 
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unequal conditions. Values produced by backward social relations of production 
and by backward productive forces meet those produced under more advanced 
conditions in the market. Tanzania's policy of Narodism effectively 
institutionalizes this backwardness. The result has not been the greater 
"self-reliance" originally predicted by radical populists, but an enormous 
balance of payments crisis and ironically an increased dependence on external 
aid which now accounts for over 60 percent of Tanzania's annual development 
budget. In addition, as long as backwardness is perpetuated at the point of 
production, the only means of compensation for its deleterious effects at the 
point of exchange is to increase the extraction of surplus value. This can 
only be accomplished by decreasing real prices and wages for peasants and 
workers coupled with an increasingly authoritarian state.25 Hence the 




1 Lenin defined middle peasant producers as those who neither hired out 
nor in, in contrast to the rural bourgeoisie and allotment holding wage 
workers. Lenin, 1974: 176-84. 
2 For a lengthy discussion of this point see Brenner, 1977. 
3 "Marx introduces a distinction between what he calls the formal and 
real 'subsumption of labor under capital.' Formal subsumption is charac-
teristic of the period of manufactures; real subsumption is characteristic of 
the modern factory with its constant revolution of production techniques and 
methods" (Mandel, Introduction to Marx, Capital I: 944). "Absolute surplus 
value is produced by a lengthening of the working day beyond that number of 
hours during which the worker produces the value which is only the equivalent 
of his wages. Relative surplus-value is produced by increasing the produc-
tivity of labor in the wage-goods industry sector, which enables the worker to 
reproduce the equivalent of his wages in a shorter portion of the working day, 
thereby increasing surplus-value without a lengthening of the working day" 
(Mandel, Introduction to Marx, Capital I: 35). 
4 The narrative in this section is drawn from a number of sources. For a 
lengthier interpretation of the viewpoint presented here see Mueller, 1979. 
For alternative but related critical analyses of the same period see the 
following: On villagization and "ujamaa" see Raikes, 1975, 1977, forthcoming 
1980; Coulson, 1975, 1977, 1979; Von Freyhold, 1977, 1979; DeVries; Fortmann, 
(b), (c); Boesen in Mwansasu and Pratt; Reeves; Shivji; Tabari, Nsari; Mihyo; 
and Saul, 1979. The references to this period are numerous. Restrictions 
concerning length prohibit a more extensive list of citations. 
5 While the state acts to extract greater and greater surplus value, 
middle peasants must also produce what they eat. Commodities are not readily 
available and when they are they are often too expensive for peasants to buy. 
This necessitates production of both use values and exchange values. This 
integration of production and consumption at the level of the household 
coupled with the inherent limitations posed by smallholding to any transfor-
mation in the value of labor power puts increasing pressure on the middle 
peasantry with predictable tendencies towards pauperization. 
6 Much more work needs to be done on this phenomenon. For some 
preliminary analyses see Shivji and Loxley in Mwansasu and Pratt. Shivji and 
others have termed this class a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie." 
7 The Narodniks were nineteenth-century Russian populists 
attacked by Lenin for their utopian views. See Venturi and Lenin, 
Vols. I and II. 
who were 
1974 and 
8 For a fuller discussion of this point and the Narodism of Tanzania's 
policies see Mueller, 1979(a). 
9 See Lofchie, 1978. 
10 A great deal more work needs to be done on this question. 
11 Raikes, forthcoming 1980 argues that the "absence of private property 
in land" (Chapter I, p. 28) forced what he calls the rich farmers into an 
21 
extremely dependent position.l As he notes, "what makes the large tractor 
farmers of northern Tanzania rich peasants rather than capitalists is in part 
the fact that in the absence of registered ( or any other secure) property 
rights, they have to engage in political manoeuvring not simply for gain 
(which they do) but in order to keep a ( reasonably) secure hold on what they 
have got ..•• " (Chapter III, p.9). 
12 For an attack on contemporary populist writings dealing with third 
world countries, see Byres' s review article of Michael Lipton's Why Poor 
People Stay Poor. 
13 Following the Arusha Declaration and the announcement of the policy 
of "ujamaa," official policy attacked the hiring-in of wage labor. It is 
probably most relatistically viewed as part of the struggle between the state 
apparatik and rural kulaks, rather than as an attack on the exploitation of 
wage labor. 
14 This is the suggestion of some of the literature dealing with 
"articulations of the mode of production." For critiques of that literature 
see Banaji, 1977; Foster-Carter, 1978; and O'Laughlin, 1977. For writers on 
Tanzania who support an articulations perspective see Bryceson, 1979, and 
Williams, 1979. 
15 For a lengthier treatment of the various types of villages in 
Tanzania and the different ways in which peasant labor has been subordinated 
to the state, see Mueller, 1979(a); Raikes, 1975, 1978, 1980; Coulson, 1977. 
16 It should be noted here that capital acts almost exclusively through 
the state, particularly in the agricultural sphere. 
17 Cowen, 1977, n.d. repeatedly makes this point in discussing the 
historical development of various forms and periods of capital in Kenya. 
18 For discussions of primitive accumulation as it relates to Tanzania 
see Bryceson, 1979, and Williams, 1979:23-32. 
19 It should be pointed out households are forced to act as if they 
possessed "relative autonomy" because the state• s policies of backward 
capitalism effectively force them into such a position, not because they are 
"traditional." 
20 Bernstein, 1977, has termed the squeeze put on household producers 
"the simple reproduction squeeze." 
21 The Marketing Development Bureau in Dar es Salaam has noted that "for 
the most part, returns to the peasant producer are extremely low when compared 
with minimum rates, despite the significant price increase of the past 3 
years. 11 MDB, Vol. 1, August 1977, p. 5. 
22 The MDB in fact reports "In the last season, world market fertilizer 
prices were at levels close to the subsidized value of fertilizer produced at 
the Tanga fertilizer factory. One could therefore argue that instead of 
receiving subsidy, tobacco farmers are paying a subsidy to the fertilizer 
factory in Tanzania." MDB, Vol. 7, September 1978, p. 22. 
22 
23 Concerning output per hectare, the MDB reported that "yields are only 
satisfactory in Tabora district where over 10,000 smallholders obtained an 
average of 890 kg per ha in 1975/76: in most other areas [excluding the large 
estates] yields are below 700 kg per ha;" MDB, Annex 7, September 1978, p. 13. 
In discussing tobacco production in Tabora and Urambo between 1964/65 and 
1976/77 Boesen notes, "throughout the period there has been a steady growth in 
the number of tobacco growers, at a growth rate of app. 18 percent per year, 
and a corresponding growth in population up to 1973/74, while in the last 
three years, since villagization, total production has remained 20 percent 
lower than in '73/74 and production per grower has fallen to less than 50 
percent of that year's figures," Boesen, p. 2. The production per grower in 
kilos decreased from 700 in 1964/65 to 740 in 1973/74, to 360 in 1976/77. 
24 In some cases the government prohibited the hiring of wage labor, 
25 See Williams, 1979, and Olle and Schoeller, 1977. 
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